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A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ONLINE COURT 
 
DORON MENASHE* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
It is no secret that many judicial systems across the globe are 
stumbling beneath a heavy burden of thousands of suits filed eve-
ry year in court.  The need to optimize the judicial system of Eng-
land and Wales led Lord Justice Briggs to write a comprehensive 
report about the subject, in which he suggests the establishment of 
a model, the first of its kind in the United Kingdom, which he 
terms the “Online Court.”  In Civil Courts Structure Review:  Final 
Report, he sets out the details of this Online Court, which I will ana-
lyze in this article. 
The article contains two main parts.  In the first part, the model 
is analyzed and broken down by its three stages.  The advantages 
inherent to the Online Court are presented, including: saving time 
and money, making the court accessible to the disadvantaged, and 
reducing the caseload of each courtroom.  Although there are 
many advantages, the Online Court has some serious drawbacks, 
including enabling frivolous lawsuits and the threat of identity 
theft by either party or even by a third party. 
In the second part, I will attack the crux of the matter, tackling 
the attendant issues raised by moving legal proceedings to a virtu-
al environment.  These aspects relate to the absence of legal repre-
sentation envisioned by the model, as well as the concern of false 
testimony. 
                                                   
* Associate Professor and Head of the LL.M Program for Adjudication and 
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debted to Guy Sender, Inbal Av, Lotem Zagagy, and Eyal Groner for their excel-
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In the final analysis the pros of this model far outweigh the 
cons.  Indeed, the model is a desirable template which should first 
be employed as a pilot program, dealing with civil proceedings 
which may be easily resolved and claims involving relatively small 
amounts of money.  Further down the road, this model may be ap-
plied to additional proceedings involving cases which are more 
expensive or more complex. 
Ultimately, the online legal system proposed constitutes the 
first step toward accommodating the court system to the innova-
tive reality of the Internet Age, in a manner which is both system-
atic and controlled.  The aim is to streamline existing legal pro-
ceedings and to make all legal services accessible, with the 
overarching ideal of “justice for all” as the guiding principle. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
With the advent of the Internet, there have been numerous 
technological innovations and developments penetrating every 
domain of society, simultaneously offering vast improvements in 
communication and information, while presenting challenges with 
protecting privacy and sensitive information.1  At the same time, 
the pace of change in life is quite rapid - access to information and 
the need for efficiency have motivated many institutions, in the 
private and the public sector to transfer at least some of their ac-
tivities and services to websites they manage.2 
These activities have contributed both to social and economic 
connections, primarily saving time and money; existing backlogs 
have been reduced, processes have been streamlined, and wait 
times have been minimized.3  To encourage the public to use these 
online services, sometimes there is a discount for those who pay 
through the website.  Moreover, there is often a quick-service 
counter set up at the offices of these institutions for those who or-
der or pay online, as will be discussed below.  
Using a website is accessible, convenient, and user-friendly.  
With the push of a button and from the convenience of one’s home, 
it is now possible to pay most bills, including electric, water, and 
property taxes.  One can even buy airplane tickets online at a dis-
count.  The Internet provides many and sundry services.  The in-
herent advantage in moving certain activities online has not es-
caped the attention of the courts.  It is no secret that justice systems 
in many countries are overburdened by a backlog of thousands of 
suits filed annually.4  
                                                   
1  See also Maureen K. Ohlhausen & Alexander P. Okuliar, Competition, Con-
sumer Protection, and the Right [Approach] To Privacy, 80 ANTITRUST L. J. 121 (2015) 
(discussing privacy in the context of consumer protections and competition). 
2  For more information on the contribution of the transition to digital gov-
ernment systems, see Executive Office of the President, Digital Government: Build-
ing a 21st Century Platform to Better Serve the American People, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/egov/digital-
government/digital-government.html [https://perma.cc/KAV9-8JLM] (describ-
ing the Digital Government Strategy initiative by Former President Barack 
Obama). 
3  Id. 
4  Lord Justice Briggs, Civil Courts Structure Review: Final Report, Judiciary of 
England and Wales (2016), 48-49, https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/civil-courts-structure-review-final-report-jul-16-final-
1.pdf [https://perma.cc/6AS7-XM4M] (providing Lord Justice Briggs’s final re-
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss4/1
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The quantity of suits is daunting, especially considering that 
the number of judges is limited, and each courtroom bends under 
the weight of so many cases.  This may be seen, inter alia, by the 
absurd length of time a case takes to wend its way through the 
court, from the moment it is filed until it is finally resolved.5  Po-
tential reforms in Israel and around the world to reduce this bur-
den, will be considered below.  
This article will analyze the civil courts structure report6 writ-
ten by Lord Justice Briggs, which presents a model for a courtroom 
on the Internet, the first of its kind in England, known as the 
Online Court.  This article will answer the following question: is 
the online court a worthy model? Beginning in England and Wales, 
the system subjects cases of less than twenty-five thousand pounds 
to an expedited process, transferring them from conventional 
courtrooms to the Internet.  The model is predicated on three es-
sential stages.7  
The first stage requires the claimant to fill out forms online.  
The judge adds relevant scanned documents.  Subsequently, the 
file moves on to the respondent, who also fills out forms and scans 
documents.  At this stage, each party has the opportunity to ex-
press anything they find relevant and germane to the suit.  Moreo-
ver, once the documents have been filed, there is an opportunity 
for the parties to communicate and seek arbitration.  
At the second stage, a clerk receives the documents and in-
spects them to ensure all forms have been properly filled out and 
all necessary documents have been submitted.  Each party can 
amend and complete missing details and documents.  Similar to 
the current procedure, the court can offer arbitration.  
The third and final stage, is the judge’s decision.  The judge 
                                                                                                                   
port of the civil courts); see also Lady Justice Arden, The Judicial System of England 
and Wales: A Visitor’s Guide, Judicial Office International Team (2016), 
https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/international-
visitors-guide-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2XM-NK6S] (providing Lady Justice 
Arden’s report on the courts, tribunals, and justice systems in England and 
Wales). 
5  For details about the quantity of cases handled by English courts according 
to legal discipline, see Arden, supra note 4 at 17; Concerning the ills of the English 
court system, see Owen Bowcott, Online court proposed to resolve claims of up to 
£25,000; Civil justice council calls for Internet-based dispute resolutions system similar to 
eBay's to be available within two years, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 16, 2015), 
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2015/feb/16/online-court-proposed-to-
resolve-claims-of-up-to-25000 [https://perma.cc/8NWH-USSG]. 
6  See Briggs, supra note 4. 
7  Id. 
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may hear testimony and ask for additional information or clarifica-
tions from either party by way of an online hearing, a conference 
call, or submitting documents.  Only as a measure of last resort, if 
the case proves to be complex or an appeal filed, there is a face-to-
face trial.  
In discussing the pros and cons of the model, other questions 
will emerge regarding establishing a courthouse on the Internet.  
The core issues of an online proceeding are:  should the online 
court be a new court or part of the conventional court system?  
Should the online court have an independent legal framework?  
Moreover, which cases may be resolved in the framework of this 
court?  Should the online court be a mandatory or voluntary pro-
ceeding?  How does the framework deal with people who have dif-
ficulties with computers?  What are the forms of payment?  What 
are the grounds for appeal?  How can the online court be secured?   
This article has two main parts.  In the first part, I will examine 
the three stages of the online court model and will try to respond 
to some of the complex above-mentioned questions.  In the frame-
work of the debate, I will look at the advantages inherent in the 
online court, including: saving time and money, access to the 
courts for the disadvantaged, an easier division of labor for judges 
dealing with online court cases, expanding the scope of issues 
which the court may handle, etc.   
Nevertheless, aside from the above-mentioned advantages, the 
online court does have some serious, but not inconsiderable draw-
backs, to which attention must be paid and for which solutions 
must be found.  For example, I will discuss the fact that the online 
court opens the door for frivolous lawsuits; the danger of identity 
theft by one of the parties or by a third party;  the need to train 
judges to use this technology;  crafting a legislative framework 
which accommodates the model of the online court;  the lack of the 
intimidation factor usually experienced by witnesses when they 
give sworn testimony in court; the concern that without face-to-
face communication, the judge will not be able to evaluate the wit-
ness’s appearance, testimony and indicators of reliability;  the con-
cern of securing the litigants’ information;  and dealing with leaks.   
In addition, I will discuss how to relocate the case to a regular 
courthouse and the methods of appeal.  As the reader shall see, 
most of these disadvantages may be easily dealt with.  
In the second part, I will deal with the meat of the matter, con-
cerning additional aspects which arise in our view from holding a 
trial in a virtual environment.  These aspects are linked to the issue 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss4/1
 
2018] A Critical Analysis of the Online Court 927 
of the lack of legal representation and the concern of error.  In ad-
dition, I will delve into the debate concerning the problematic na-
ture of testimony in a virtual environment; the concern about false 
testimony grows with the absence of the pomp and circumstance 
associated with testifying in court.  I will suggest tools to deal with 
this problem, proposing a normative model which will give judges 
wide discretion to give any order or remedy, or alternatively to 
rule on costs in exceptional circumstances.  After taking into ac-
count the pros and cons of the online court model, in the final 
analysis the former outweighs the latter. 
 
2.  DISSECTING THE THREE-STAGE MODEL OF THE ONLINE COURT 
 
This is not the first of its kind; the legal literature shows that 
other models of online courts have been employed.  In the United 
States, the state of Michigan set up a model for an online court to 
deal with business and commercial suits of more than twenty-five 
thousand dollars.  This virtual courtroom was built as a pilot pro-
gram by the College of William & Mary Law School,8 the National 
Center for State Courts and its Court Technology Laboratory.9  In 
addition, there are American courts in which hearings are held us-
                                                   
8  Id.  To expand on the idea of a courthouse on the Internet, see generally Lu-
cille M. Ponte, The Michigan Cyber Court: A Bold Experiment in the Development of the 
First Public Virtual Courthouse, 4 N. C. J. L. & TECH. 51 (2002).  
9  Established in 1993, the Courtroom 21 project is a collaborative effort be-
tween the College of William & Mary Law School and the National Center for 
State Courts (NCSC) and the NCSC's Court Technology Laboratory.  Courtroom 
21 at the McGlothlin Courtroom is considered to be one of the most technological-
ly advanced courtrooms in the world.  Courtroom 21 provides training programs 
on courtroom technology and seeks to act as a resource for those studying and 
considering the use and impact of technology on court processes; see CENTER FOR 
LEGAL & COURT TECHNOLOGY, http://www.legaltechcenter.net (providing infor-
mation on the Courtroom 21 project).  See also Frederic I. Lederer, Courtroom Prac-
tice in the 21st Century, TRIAL 1 (July 1999), 
http://www.ncsc.dni.us/NCSC/TIS/TIS99/CtromtecTrial2.html and Frederic I. 
Lederer, The Courtroom as a Stop on the Information Super Highway, 71 THE AUSTL J. 
L. REFORM 4, (1997), 
http://www.courtroom21.net/About.Us/Articles/AUSTLREF.HTML (describ-
ing the implications of technological advancements in the courtroom).  The project 
considers itself to be the model for the proposed Michigan Cyber Court. Press Re-
lease, Immersive Virtual Reality to Be Used in Groundbreaking Experimental Tri-
al (n.d.), http://www.courtroom2l.net/Currentevents/Currentevents.htm (last 
visited June 27, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technolo-
gy). 
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ing conference calls.10  Similarly, there are courts operating now in 
an advanced-technology environment and with digital aids, such 
as the Florida court system.11  
Another example of extending the activities of the court be-
yond the courthouse walls via the Internet has been partially im-
plemented in Israel using the “Net Hamishpat” system of the judi-
ciary,12 which computerized clerkship in the court system.  The 
president of the then Supreme Court Beinisch pointed to the con-
tribution of Net Hamishpat in her ruling on The Association for Civil 
Rights in Israel v. Minister of Justice13 noting that the website in-
creased immeasurably the access of the Israeli public to the courts 
and their rulings.14  
On the one hand, this initiative of computerizing the courts 
contributed to the greater public and to those who deal profession-
ally with the legal system by increasing efficiency and availability, 
cutting wait times, and simplifying the process.  On the other 
hand, its implementation brought to the surface a number of defi-
ciencies, some technical and some inherent, which may inform the 
English online court model of some of the difficulties which it may 
face.15  
                                                   
10  See  Susan Nauss Exon, The Internet Meets Obi-Wan Kenobi in the Court of 
Next Resort, 8 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 1, 5-6 (2002) (discussing the impact of the In-
ternet on the judicial decision-making process). 
11  See Lin Walker, Courtroom 23, Orange County Florida, CT. TECH. BULL. 
(1999), http://www.ncsc.dni.us/NCSC/TIS/TIS99/CTB/1999/PIPCtrm23.htm 
[https://perma.cc/3ZWX-9CVF] (discussing Courtroom 23, a technologically-
advanced courtroom); see also Courtroom 23+, Courtroom 23, 
http://www.ninja9.org/courtadmin/mis/courtroom_23.htm 
[https://perma.cc/VRR4-L9WU] (providing information on Courtroom 23, a 
technologically-advanced courtroom).  
12  Israel Courts Official Website, Net Hamishpat (2003) [Hebrew], 
https://www.court.gov.il/NGCS.Web.Site/HomePage.aspx1 
[https://perma.cc/DV83-2AM5].  
13  Arbel, Dan, Computerization of the Courts in the 2000s (1999) [Hebrew] 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/heb/rashut/alon/arbel.doc [https://perma.cc/DV83-
2AM5].  The system is based on the “electronic lawsuit” concept, also known as 
the paperless courthouse.  The system, inter alia, allows one to file suit electroni-
cally, with a lawyer uploading the suit form his office without handing in files 
and claims to the court clerk.  In addition, documents and affidavits may be 
scanned in, petitions and appeals filed, court dates set, decisions received, files 
consulted and many other services. 
14  HCJ 5917/97, The Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. the State of Israel, 
NEVO (Aug. 10, 2007), https://www.nevo.co.il/psika_html/elyon/97059170-
n25.htm [https://perma.cc/EL9S-9S7C]. 
15  For the obstacles encountered at the launch of the Net Hamishpat system, 
see Annual State Comptroller’s Report #60B, Actions & Criticism: Processes and Ac-
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss4/1
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It is not inconceivable that a system which for decades em-
ployed adversarial, frontal debate, when transferred to a parallel 
web interface, may give rise to several difficulties.  There is a broad 
consensus that the model is desirable and must from its inception 
be based on easily-resolved civil proceedings and relatively small 
amounts of money.  In this setting, I deal with the question of opt-
in versus opt-out services.  The former applies the model to all 
proceedings, afterwards mapping what appears to not fit in the 
system.  The latter proposes first using this system for minor pro-
ceedings and afterwards adding more and more complex proceed-
ings.  I support the former model, although he argues that the first 
cases to be tried this way should not be small claims, but rather 
civil suits of up to twenty-five thousand pounds, to be settled in an 
expedited process based on the innovative method of litigants 
conducting the trial online without legal representation. 
The pilot program should be applied to small claims specifical-
ly.  Currently, in small-claims cases, the parties are not represented 
by lawyers, and the rules of evidence usually observed in court are 
not enforced.  Only after the online court has been fully imple-
mented for small claims, with all the attendant deficiencies and 
amendments, can this model be applied to more complex and ex-
pensive cases.16 
The next part will focus on the problems inherent in a lack of 
representation.  A close analysis of the English court system re-
veals an unfortunate situation of excessive pressure on the courts, 
with exorbitant court costs and a shocking backlog.17  The price of 
justice is far too high, beginning with the fees for legal representa-
tion and spreading to other areas, so the legal system serves the in-
terests of the well–off, while the disadvantaged cannot enjoy the 
legal services the courts are supposed to provide, which often pre-
vents them from ever filing suit.18  Transferring the courtroom to 
the virtual realm allows the service to become better and more effi-
cient, saving time and money and promoting justice for all.  True, it 
demands a costly investment at the outset, but the ongoing costs 
for the court system will be significantly less compared to current 
                                                                                                                   
tivities to Computerize the Courts (2010), 
http://www.mevaker.gov.il/he/Reports/Report_292/fa399d37-04ae-462b-bf33-
7e29aae86e2a/part238-mishpatim.docx [https://perma.cc/X3T3-3XSF]. 
16  Ponte, supra note 8 at 61. 
17  Briggs, supra note 4 at 48-49. 
18  See id. at 51–52 (discussing the price of litigation and also work-hour losses 
caused by spending time waiting in a court). 
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costs, without the online option.  Savings will be realized in terms 
of construction, organization, administration of the courts (mainte-
nance, security, visitors’ services, office and clerk costs), and a 
drastic reduction in office work and paperwork. 
Another advantage will be to make it easier to file a claim, 
without excessive effort or peril and without unnecessary costs of 
precious time or resources.  Thus, for example, forms may be filled 
in online and documents may be scanned and uploaded, circum-
venting the current onerous process of handing in every relevant 
piece of paper by hand.19  In addition, through using the interface, 
the parties may formulate their claims in a far better manner.  Simi-
larly, if the litigants so wish, they may reach a stage at which the 
decision will be made by a qualified judge. 
On the other hand, in order to prevent frivolous claims, a 
method of filtering must be employed, so that parties filing such 
claim will be found liable for costs.20  An additional advantage is 
that judges will have more free time to deal with cases in the con-
ventional court, while the division of labor for judges in the online 
court system can be split into shifts spread out over the duration of 
the day.21  The quantity of the judges working in the online court 
will depend on the quantity of claims filed via the website.  For this 
purpose, it is essential that the judges go through technological 
training for working online.22 
In addition, it is necessary to pass appropriate legislation that 
will accommodate online court, responding to the challenges posed 
by the work of adjudicating online,23 including the lack of frontal, 
adversarial proceedings allowing the parties to use their represent-
                                                   
19  See, e.g., Ponte, supra note 8, at 80 (discussing streamlining the cyber court 
process to leverage the benefits of current online technologies); Fredric I. Lederer, 
The Road to the Virtual Courtroom? A Consideration of Today's—and Tomorrow's—
High–Technology Courtrooms, 50 S. C. L. REV. 799, 803–807 (1999) (explaining how 
modern technologies are the foundation of online court systems); Richard L. Mar-
cus, Confronting the Future: Coping with Discovery of Electronic Material, 64 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROB. 253, 266, 272–273 (2001) (discussing issues arising from electronic 
discovery). 
20  But see Theodore Eisenberg et al., When Courts Determine Fees in a System 
with a Loser Pays Norm: Fee Award Denials to Winning Plaintiffs and Defendants, 60 
UCLA L. REV. 1452 (2013) (noting that prevailing parties are not always awarded 
costs). 
21  See Ponte, supra note 8, at 59 (discussing judges appointing procedure in a 
Michigan Cyber Court). 
22  Id. 
23  See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan, UNJUST ENRICHMENT: A STUDY OF PRIVATE LAW 
AND PUBLIC VALUES 31-32 (1997). 
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atives to expose the core issues at the heart of the conflict before 
the court.  Instead, the verdict is based on documentation present-
ed by the parties, and if necessary, hearings to take place on the in-
ternet. 
The online court will be able to take advantage to technological 
aids, such as telephone and internet conference calls, carried out on 
computer screens.24  In a case where the proceedings take place 
without attorneys, filing in online court will be unattractive for 
parties such as business executives, since they will have to fill in all 
the information themselves, an activity which they are used to del-
egating.  Regarding forms, it will naturally be impossible to verify 
the identity of the person filling in the document, and nothing pre-
vents the litigants from using legal staff to assist in the process.25  If 
this is the case, there is no doubt that the advantages of holding 
hearings online will be particularly attractive to those companies 
dealing with lawsuits on a daily basis.  Whether a lawyer partici-
pates or not has little bearing on the need for the litigant to be pre-
sent at a hearing, the way these are held in physical courtrooms 
today.  When the testimony is offered in a virtual environment and 
by way of an office computer screen, this will allow businessmen 
and executives to continue their daily routine with maximum effi-
ciency and without having to personally appear with their repre-
sentatives in court, possibly wasting valuable work–hours in court-
room argumentation.26 
Granted, one of the problems of holding a trial in a virtual en-
vironment, is where the litigant testifies; the litigant could be in an 
environment they find most comfortable, home or office.  This sit-
uation lacks the awe which usually attends to appearances in the 
courtroom, with the ceremony and physical presence of a judge.27  
In an online case, the parties testifying may feel free—perhaps ex-
                                                   
24  See Fredric I. Lederer, Courtroom Technology: For Trial Lawyers, the Future Is 
Now, 19 CRIMINAL JUSTICE MAGAZINE 14 (2004) (discussing technology related is-
sues and ways of resolving them). 
25  Cf. Bowcott, supra note 5 (“About 80% of the UK population are estimated 
to be internet users . . . and only 3% of the adult population have no one who can 
help them go online.”).  The new Internet model proposes that the court admin-
istration will provide help to those facing difficulty in filling out the forms and 
providing documents, see Azeez, infra note 43 (“There is also a help desk at the 
County Court Bulk Centre.”). 
26  Cf. Gordon Bermant & Winton D. Woods, Real Questions about the Virtual 
Courthouse, 78 JUDICATURE 64, 67 (1994). 
27  Cf. Marilyn Krawitz & Justine Howard, Should Australian Courts Give More 
Witnesses the Right to Skype?, 25 JOURNAL OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 44 (2015). 
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cessively so—to testify falsely.28 
However, without being dismissive of this challenge, today a 
considerable portion of the testimonies presented in civil proceed-
ings are gathered by deposition.  A witness seeking to deceive may 
easily do so through a deposition.  If a situation arises where the 
testimony's reliability is unclear, or if the case is appealed on this 
ground, the classic court would take over.29 
It seems, then, that if the choice is between audio and video 
communications, the latter is certainly preferable.30  That is due to 
the reasons mentioned above, in addition to the difficulty faced by 
a judge attempting to evaluate a witness’s testimony, appearance 
and signals of reliability.31  Furthermore, as long as video cross–
examination is possible, most of the advantages of confrontation 
are maintained.  Therefore, it is not certain that the difference be-
tween video and in–court testimony is so vast as to justify sacrific-
ing the efficiency inherent to the online court.  After all, the epis-
temic interpretation of body language, even based on face–to–face 
observation, is far from being precise.  Complex concerns and 
questions are raised by the online court model, but the serious ad-
vantages in efficiency might outweigh any disadvantages.  In Part 
3 of this article, I will discuss additional issues related to testimony 
in a virtual environment and methods for dealing with them. 
Those who support the rule of administrative justice would 
agree that procedural efficiency is a value worth advancing, even 
more than others, such as the pursuit of truth and justice.  Their 
opponents would counter that a just trial is difficult to produce in a 
virtual environment, and the nature of the proceeding strays from 
the classic adversarial system,32 being more similar to the French 
                                                   
28  See, e.g., Russell Kostelak, Videoconference Technology and the Confrontation 
Clause, at 5, Cornell Law School J.D. Research Papers, Paper 33, CORNELL LAW 
LIBRARY (Apr. 24, 2014), 
https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1049&context=l
ps_papers [https://perma.cc/92QG-54XA]. 
29  Cf. Richard Susskind, Online disputes: Is It Time To End The 'Day In Court'?, 
THE TIMES (LONDON), February 26, 2015 ("If  complex  claims  were  to  come  be-
fore  online  facilitators  or  judges,  we  would  expect  them  to  assign these to 
the traditional court system.  Online dispute resolution is not suitable for all cas-
es."). 
30  See Lederer, supra note 24. 
31  See Kostelak, supra note 28, at 4 (discussing reliability of modern technolo-
gy in online courts); Krawitz & Howard, supra note 27, at 8 (discussing use of 
skype for witness testifies). 
32  The adversarial justice system relies on two parties, represented by coun-
sel, presenting their strongest arguments to the court, which arguably makes the 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss4/1
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model, where the judge is also the investigator. 
The quality of justice is not adversely impacted in the transition 
to an online setting, as contemporary real–life courtrooms do not 
have the capacity to deal with their caseloads within reasonable 
timeframes.  The fact that some litigants may expect the legal sys-
tem to address their claims for years on end demonstrates that 
whatever justice is offered in the current system, it is left wanting.  
Today, most legal disputes never reach a verdict by a judge or jury; 
rather, the parties most often reach a settlement.  Thus, the second 
stage I propose does not drastically change the status quo. 
Using the online mechanism, many conflicts may be resolved 
in a more efficient and speedy manner, some being resolved with-
out the involvement of a judge (the second stage in the proceed-
ing).  Ultimately, promoting efficiency might also promote justice, 
by making courts easier to utilize and more accessible, while pre-
venting delay in the legal process. 
Today, it is also appropriate to integrate the process of alterna-
tive dispute resolution33 into the online model, so it will be carried 
out in the virtual courthouse.  Appropriate cases may be routed 
towards this kind of process, which often produces an efficient and 
inexpensive result, while maintaining the consent and participa-
tion of both parties.34  This may be termed ODR (“Online dispute 
resolution”).35 
An essential element of the proposed model is the identifica-
tion of the parties.36  This is a challenging problem, because, in a 
forum where any person may file a claim, it is important to prevent 
                                                                                                                   
investigation of the truth an easier task for the court.  See, e.g., Robert Gilbert 
Johnston & Sara Lufrano, The Adversary System as a Means of Seeking Truth and Jus-
tice, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 147 (2002); Gerald Walpin, America's Adversarial and 
Jury Systems: More Likely to Do Justice, 26 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 175 (2003). 
33  For an introduction to alternative dispute resolution in the U.K. court sys-
tem, see Arden, supra note 4, at 18. 
34  See, e.g., Michael R. Hogan, Judicial Settlement Conferences: Empowering the 
Parties to Decide Through Negotiation, 27 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 429 (1991); Jeffrey A. 
Parness, Improving Judicial Settlement Conferences, 39 U. C. DAVIS L. REV. 1891 
(2006). 
35  ETHAN KATSH & ORNA RABINOVICH-EINY, DIGITAL JUSTICE: TECHNOLOGY 
AND THE INTERNET OF DISPUTES 17-24 (Oxford University Press 2017). 
36  Cf. Md Nadeem Ahmed, A Model for Protecting Online Banking Using Trans-
action Monitoring, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMPUTER NETWORKS AND 
COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY (Mar. 2015), 
http://www.ijcncs.org/published/volume3/issue3/p3_3-3.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6ZZM-SPG8] (discussing identification of transacting parties 
in online banking). 
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one party from impersonating the other, or a third party from do-
ing so.37  To illustrate this, assume A files suit against B.  A then 
impersonates B and submits a false answer.  The process will yield 
a finding of liability for B, without B ever knowing about the trial.  
Conversely, what happens when a person loses a lawsuit they nev-
er filed? 
Today, parties typically identify themselves before their respec-
tive lawyers prior to filing court papers.  Israeli lawyers verify their 
identity using a smart card, which is required for them to initiate a 
proceeding and manage it through the Net Hamishpat website.38  
Before the filing of a pleading, motion or other court paper is final-
ized, the lawyer must use both the smart card and a password to 
electronically sign the uploaded document; the system can display 
the name of the lawyer responsible for uploading each document.39  
In addition, hearings are still held in court before a judge, so it is 
more difficult to steal another’s identity.  This concern increases 
when more activity is conducted online, without human supervi-
sion. 
A suggested solution for dealing with the challenge of identifi-
cation is appointing a designated official, stationed in a court-
house, post office or bank, before whom parties will identify them-
selves with identification cards or other official government 
documentation.  The official will record the data after confirming 
its veracity and then give the party an access code to file court pa-
pers online. 
Presenting materials for verifying one’s identity, when person-
al, sensitive or confidential activities are concerned, is a well–
accepted method.  It is similar to the method employed by the Net 
Hamishpat system, as described above.  In both the traditional and 
online models, primary identification through documentation be-
fore a human agent is required.  A similar process is used when a 
bank provides one of its account–holders with credentials to access 
                                                   
37  For more on identity theft and methods for dealing with it, see Debra 
Lindberg et al., Prevention of Identity Theft: A Review of the Literature, Criminology 
and Criminal Justice Senior Capstone Project, PORTLAND STATE UNIVERSITY (2011), 
https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=c
cj_capstone [https://perma.cc/3SRY-73BH] (discussing crimes caused by identity 
theft in the Internet); Ali Hedayati, An Analysis Of Identity Theft: Motives, Related 
Frauds, Techniques And Prevention, 4 J.  LAW CONFLICT RESOLUT.1 (2012), 
http://www.academicjournals.org/article/article1379859409_Hedayati.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B6KP-RZR9]. 
38  Arbel, supra note 13, at 16. 
39  Id. 
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online services.  The initial identification is processed by a teller or 
clerk.  Afterwards, the account holder may access the account on 
their own. 
There are many models for online banking security.  The sim-
plest way utilizes the IP address of the account–holder.  This ad-
dress is specific to a computer and thus may easily be recognized 
by the bank’s systems.  However, today there are programs which 
can spoof an IP address, essentially “lying” to the bank’s systems; 
for this reason, it is recommended to give a one–time password to 
the account–holder via the mobile phone or email address on rec-
ord.  This solution significantly reduces the ability to impersonate 
others online.  There are additional models, more complex and ab-
struse, including passwords integrated with biometric tools.40  
Naturally, identity theft is not utterly eliminated by recurring a 
human agent at the point of first contact; identity thieves continue 
to evolve and to develop new methods as technology advances.  
Nevertheless, we must bear in mind that most of the public has no 
interest in stealing each other’s identities; identification measures 
are designed to filter out the simplest cases of impersonation.  
When no such safeguards exist, even the most obvious cases slip 
through. 
Another important viewpoint is public confidence in the sys-
tem.  To what extent would people want to obligate themselves to 
amounts of twenty-five thousand pounds through an unsecured 
website?  To what extent would people want to submit documents 
which have personal or private information — contracts, bank ac-
counts and other evidence — whether as plaintiffs or defendants, 
without knowing that the other party had to submit some form of 
identification to a human being in order to access the website in the 
first place? Identification of both parties before a human agent, in 
addition to the secured website, provides the feeling of security 
and trustworthiness for the site in the eyes of the public.41  
Another element to consider, which is missing from the model 
and relates to securing information on the Internet which contains 
the personal information of many people, is the concern of whether 
people will be prepared to upload personal files and transfer sums 
in the thousands of pounds in online court.42  
                                                   
40  Id. See also Donald R. Moscato and Shoshana Altschuller, "International 
Perceptions of Online Banking Security Concerns," Communications of the IIMA: 
Vol. 12: Iss. 3, Article 4 (2014). 
41  Id. 
42  Id. 
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The problem of data leaks is analyzed at length concerning the 
biometric database maintained by the government; the likelihood 
of someone breaking into the database and making criminal use of 
the information is a pressing concern.43  To summarize, the two   
elements of identifying the parties and establishing a secure site 
are intertwined.  Without this minimal level of trustworthiness, the 
public will not utilize the site at all. 
Once the suit has been filed, the bank or the post office legally 
issues the claim to the defendant, based on the legal regulations 
and the username which the defendant uses to file their own affi-
davit of defense, with the possibility of using e-mail or SMS to no-
tify the defendant.  However, this is somewhat problematic, as the 
defendant may deny receiving such a message.44  
The best platform for the online court to adopt would be one 
similar to that of eBay.  As eBay already deals with thousands of 
orders, complaints and interactions between buyers and sellers on 
a secure site which protects customers’ information, there is no 
need to build a new site from scratch.45  
Moreover, the established framework must include specific in-
formation about every single case that the online court may deal 
with.  The website must be flexible and updatable, as laws change 
from time to time.  It is also essential that the directions not be 
composed in legalese, but rather in clear, simple vernacular; there 
should be multilingual options.  
In addition, there must be help screens to guide users and ex-
plain the basics to them, including legal principles.  The parties 
may use these explanations to understand what topics should be 
focused on, so that they do not bring suits which have no chance of 
succeeding.  The development of ODR will be elaborated below. 
With that in mind, should the online court be a mandatory or 
voluntary institution?  Initially, this should be a voluntary institu-
tion.  The plaintiff may present the suit in a real-life courtroom or a 
virtual courtroom46 to protect public confidence and the implemen-
tation of the site using the incentivized model I mentioned above.  
At this point, the debate about the attractiveness of opening the 
                                                   
43  Madhavi Gudavalli, D. Srinivasa Kumar and S. Viswanadha Raju, 8 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SECURITY AND ITS APPLICATIONS 103, 112 (2014). 
44  Walé Azeez, “Online: e-commerce: Stake a claim in cyber court: Go online 
to recover debts.  It's easier than doing it in person,” The Guardian, 28 February 
2002 (henceforth: Azeez). 
45  Susskind, supra note 29. 
46  Ponte, supra note 8, at 61. 
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process on the Internet is lacking. 
Today in England, a small claim can be filed online without a 
fee.47  A comparable incentivized model exists in the Michigan 
Cyber Court: filing the suit in the online court means a reduced fee 
compared to doing so in real court.  This is similar to the incentiv-
ized model which airlines have; ordering online allows customers 
to save money without an agent’s fee.  It is important to use an in-
centivizing model to motivate plaintiffs to use the new online inter-
face.48  
Moreover, another consideration lacking at the moment is the 
question of a respondent who has no interest in participating in an 
online trial and wants to move the proceeding to a frontal process 
in a traditional court.  Such transferring of the case to a regular 
courtroom under specific criteria, should be allowed.  However, 
the party which wants to transfer the proceeding to a real court to 
receive a judge’s verdict must bear the cost of an additional fee to 
the court.49  
One criterion for relocating the proceeding should be that the 
respondent is a private individual.  This is a principle in small-
claims courts in Israel — only an individual may initiate such a 
proceeding.  It appears that the Israeli legislature has considered 
the need to protect private individuals from the broad gap between 
them and those entities which have “deep pockets.”  Similarly, it is 
best to say here that only a private individual can petition to have 
the proceeding moved to a frontal venue.  It may be inevitable, if 
powerful entities have the right to petition the court to transfer 
proceedings from the virtual world to the real one, they will do so 
automatically, to dissuade the less privileged from filing suit and 
then losing time, work, and money to be physically present in 
court, which will make the whole enterprise untenable for the lat-
ter.50  
Moreover, it is recommended that appeals of the online court’s 
ruling be limited to appeal by permission.51  This is in order to 
                                                   
47  See a table comparing the rates paid on the website to those in the court-
house at: https://www.gov.uk/make-court-claim-for-money/court-fees. 
48  Ponte, supra note 8, at 76, 89-90. 
49  For another expansion of the issue of determining court costs, see Eisen-
berg, supra note 22. 
50  See para. 60A, Courts Law (Consolidated), 5744-1984, S.H. 198 (henceforth: 
Courts Law). 
51  Peter D. Marshall, A Comparative Analysis of the Right to Appeal, 22:1, 21.11 
DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol (2011). 
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avoid a situation in which a case is retried in a regular court as 
long as the appeal is by right.  A corporation may automatically 
appeal to the district court.  The aim should be for cases adjudicat-
ed in the online court to be settled there.52 
Up until this point, the online court model raises questions in a 
number of areas, some of them procedural, some of them technical 
and technological: identification of the parties, securing their 
online information, ensuring privacy with all of its complexities.  
Now I will deal with some important points to ponder concerning 
the online process:  representation on the Internet and the risk of 
error, holding a trial in a virtual environment and the expressive-
ceremonial aspects of justice, video testimony, dissuading witness-
es from false testimony, balance and sanctions. 
 
3.  HOLDING A TRIAL IN A VIRTUAL ENVIRONMENT:  A CRITICAL 
VIEW 
 
When reviewing the civil courts structure report53 written by 
Lord Justice Briggs, which presents a model for online court, there 
is a particular focus on litigants without representation.  The num-
ber of people advertising counsel for litigants without representa-
tion seems to be increasing.  On the one hand, there is a need to 
streamline organizations to assists parties who do not have legal 
representation, so they may access practical information and sup-
port throughout the litigation process.  Similarly, for those litigants 
who choose to use the Internet, there needs to be legal advice either 
free of charge or at a reasonable price.  On the other hand, organi-
zational duplication must be avoided concerning anyone who will 
have the authority to offer technical and legal assistance.54  
Lord Briggs's interim report of the civil courts structure notes 
organizational difficulties in assisting litigants without representa-
tion and the courts’ inability to help them.  The report does not ig-
nore the attempts made previously to assist litigants; on the contra-
ry, it praises those efforts.  As an example, some of the assistance 
                                                   
52  Para. 64 of the Courts Law determines that a verdict in small-claims court 
may be appealed to the district court if the district court judge gives permission.  
A different judge must then preside over the trial in district court. 
53  See Briggs, supra note 4. 
54  LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS, JUDICIARY OF ENGLAND AND WALES, CIVIL COURTS 
STRUCTURE REVIEW INTERIM REPORT, 3.38-3.45. (December 2015). 
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includes legal explanations, help filling out forms, clarifying legal 
terminology, etc.  These elements are added in the final report as 
an assortment of recommendations to offer legal aid in the stages 
before the proceedings, advancing the legal education of the pub-
lic.  There is quite a ways to go before this model of assistance will 
be complete.55  The final report of Lord Justice Briggs proposes that 
the online court operate without legal representation.56  
Litigation without representation is not a wise course, aside 
from exceptional cases, such as small claims or litigants with a le-
gal background.  Rabeea Assy deals with the arguments against 
the right to self-representation in his sweeping work, Injustice in 
Person: The Right to Self-Representation.57  Moreover, there is another 
argument against self-representation beyond what Assy raises, 
which is the risk of error.58  Every civil trial has a risk of error, such 
as the danger of a wrongful verdict; however, the odds of an incor-
rect verdict increase when litigants are not represented.  I share 
Assy’s view that self-representation is inherently inferior to litiga-
tion with representation.  Litigating on behalf of one’s self creates a 
greater risk of error than representation by another. 
One argument is that people choose self-representation out of 
an overly confident estimation of their own abilities or, alternative-
ly, because they feel they have no choice due to financial duress.   
Indeed, in the English system, the right to self-representation is 
almost unqualified; data shows that most litigants who choose self-
representation do so because they feel they have no choice.59  For 
example, a 2014 survey of those who chose self-representation in 
                                                   
55  Id., at  5.52-5.47. 
56  LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS, JUDICIARY OF ENGLAND AND WALES, CHANCERY 
MODERNISATION REVIEW FINAL REPORT, 6.22-6.39. (December 2013). 
57  Although self-representation is regarded as sacrosanct in common law ju-
risdictions, most civil law systems take a diametrically opposite view and impose 
obligations of legal representation as a condition for conducting civil litigation, 
except in low-value claims courts or specific tribunals.  In his book, Rabeea Assy 
emphasizes the theoretical value of self-representation, and he challenges the 
conventional perception that ties self-representation to a fundamental right.  All in 
all, Assy develops a new justification for mandatory legal representation, based 
on several aspects.  See generally  RABEEA ASSY, INJUSTICE IN PERSON: THE RIGHT TO 
SELF-REPRESENTATION (2015). 
58  See generally Doron Menashe & Eyal Gruner, Litigants in Person and the Risk 
of Error: A New Perspective on Rabeea Assy’s Injustice in Person: The Right to Self-
Representation 35 Civ. Just. Q. 237 (2016). 
59  See George Applebey, Justice without Lawyers? Litigants in Person in the Eng-
lish Civil Courts, 18 HOLDSWORTH L. REV. 109, 109-12 (1997) (describing the “explo-
sion of litigants in person” in English civil courts). 
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England found that most did so because they felt they had no 
choice: They neither had sufficient funds to hire representation nor 
were entitled to free legal aid.60  Although half of those who chose 
self-representation received legal advice at some point, almost all 
of them encountered difficulties with the legal proceedings. 
In addition, it appears that most of those who chose self-
representation were defendants, not plaintiffs.  Most were male, 
young, welfare recipients, and had a lower level of education than 
those who had legal representation. 
We may divide the motivations for self-representation into 
three categories: cost, choice, and difficulties in receiving legal aid.  
In this study and other previous studies, 75% to 80% of the litigants 
chose self-representation because of one of the above-mentioned 
reasons, and only 20% to 25% did so by choice.  Furthermore, it 
was found that most of those who chose self-representation due to 
cost or difficulty in receiving legal aid would have received assis-
tance from an attorney, if they had the choice.  In addition, they be-
lieved that if they had such a resource, they would have had better 
results.61  
In 2012, England instituted a reform of legal aid.  This reduced 
entitlements to receive free legal aid to save on costs and to en-
courage conflict resolution outside the courthouse.  Since it has 
been put into effect, the number of cases in which the party chose 
self-representation has increased.62  
In the past, many of those who chose self-representation did so 
of their own volition.  However, most of them did so because of an 
inability to hire lawyers and ineligibility to receive legal aid after 
the reform.  It is reasonable to assume that a person who chooses 
self-representation out of free will be more capable of doing so 
than one forced into such a situation.63  
                                                   
60  See generally Self-representation rises after legal aid cuts, Inst. Emp’t Rts. (Jan. 
22, 2015), http://www.ier.org.uk/news/self-representation-rises-after-legal-aid-
cuts [https://perma.cc/8AEE-MDMC].  
61  See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, LITIGANTS IN PERSON IN PRIVATE FAMILY LAW CASES, 
2014, at 11-21 (UK) (describing characteristics of litigants in person, reasons for 
self-representation, and the features of partial representation). 
62  See Id. An analysis of all family court cases in England, from January 2014 
to March 2014, showed that in 80% of  cases, at least one of the sides was not rep-
resented by an attorney.   
63  Mainly after the reform, it was discovered that a large segment of the liti-
gants not represented were people who had difficulty presenting their case in the 
best way, whether due to a lack of education, a lack of self-confidence, learning 
difficulties or any other obstacle which might prevent one from having a success-
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It can be concluded that in the context of legal proceedings 
over a long period, there tend to be far more wrongful verdicts in 
cases of self-representation than litigation by representation.64  
Granted, the damage is less harmful in civil cases than it would be 
in criminal cases, but self-representation still poses a significant 
threat to a correct verdict. 
Some of the risks of error in civil proceedings can significantly 
damage the litigants’ welfare.  For example, family court exists in 
the civil realm: a decision in the matter of child custody, declaring 
a minor a dependent, removing a minor from the custody of their 
parents to the custody of the state, an adoption order for a minor, 
or a restraining order keeping an individual out of their residence 
due to a concern of violence and the like.  
Generally speaking, the losing party in a civil suit naturally has 
negative feelings: disappointment, frustration, and bitterness—not 
to speak of the financial hit.  This is true whether the loser is a 
plaintiff whose suit has been rejected, a defendant against whom a 
suit has been accepted, or even a plaintiff who has been awarded 
less than what they think they deserve.  When the verdict is mis-
taken, these unpleasant emotions are unjustified.  Had the verdict 
been correct, there would have been no ill will.  
To illustrate this, consider a dispute in commercial law.  There 
is a normative aim to be achieved through law enforcement, pro-
tecting private property, distributive justice, restorative justice, and 
economic efficiency.  A wrongful verdict impinges on the right to 
                                                                                                                   
ful encounter with the legal process.  See HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, LITIGANTS 
IN PERSON: THE RISE OF THE SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANT IN CIVIL AND FAMILY CASES, 
2016, HC 07113, at 5-7 (Eng. & Wales) (describing the relationship between self-
represented litigants and The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders 
Act 2012). 
64  For empirical facts, indicating that, in civil law, litigants without represen-
tation receive inferior results compared to those who do have representation, see 
ASSY, supra note 57, at 12 (“Because LIPs lack adequate understanding of proce-
dural and substantive law, a passive arbiter is not presented with the clash of evi-
dence and argument that is necessary to establish a correct outcome.”).  As for 
criminal cases, analysis of the first 130 cases of exoneration due to the activities of 
the Innocence Project using DNA testing showed that 32% of the wrongful convic-
tions were due to inadequate counsel.  See BARRY SCHECK, PETER NEUFELD & JIM 
DWYER, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: WHEN JUSTICE GOES WRONG AND HOW TO MAKE IT 
RIGHT 242 (2003) (“Studies by the Innocent Project found that 32 percent of the 
wrongfully convicted had subpar or outright incompetent legal help.”).  However, 
those data refer to inadequate or incompetent counsel, not a lack thereof.  Never-
theless, we may assume that similar or more severe failures would exist in a case 
of lack or representation, so that a lack of representation would create the risk of 
wrongful conviction at least as much as inadequate representation, if not more so. 
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private property, seizing possessions that rightfully belong to one 
party and handing them to the other without any legal justifica-
tion.  This undermines the owner’s right to property.65  Conversely, 
a rightful verdict makes certain that the rightful owner retains their 
money or property.  
Moreover, a wrongful verdict may also undermine distributive 
justice as the normative aim is to allocate resources in a fair way.66  
Beyond this, restorative justice is also harmed.67  If the verdict is 
correct, the situation will be restored to its correct state, with a tort 
or contract violation rectified, but a wrongful verdict prevents this 
from happening.  Additionally, when the legal norm is to advance 
economic efficiency, a wrongful verdict creates an inefficient situa-
tion.68  
                                                   
65  For the concept of private property as a tool to protect freedom, see JOHN 
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 298 (1993) (discussing how “the right to hold and to 
have the exclusive use of personal property” is “among the basic liberties of the 
person”). 
66  For the distributive view in private law in general, see HANOCH DAGAN, 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT: A STUDY OF PRIVATE LAW AND PUBLIC VALUES 31-32 (1997) (dis-
cussing how the law of unjust enrichment has “an important distributive compo-
nent”); DUNCAN KENNEDY, SEXY DRESSING ETC. 83 (1993) (discussing the relation-
ship between the law and the skewed distribution of wealth, income, power, and 
access to knowledge “along class and race lines”).  As for distributive justice in 
contract law, this value contradicts the principle of freedom of contracts, because 
the contract is determined by the consent of each side, not justice.  However, there 
is theoretical writing on contract law according to which a fitting aim of contract 
law is establishing social justice between the parties.  See generally Duncan Kenne-
dy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); 
Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 (1980).  
As for distributive justice in tort suits, there are issues of risk distribution and the 
“deep pockets” consideration.  See Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distri-
bution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 527 (1961) (detailing the “deep pocket 
consideration”); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 77 (1881) (“The state 
might conceivably make itself a mutual insurance company against accidents, and 
distribute the burdens of its citizens’ mishaps among all its members.”).  
67  As for restorative justice in tort suits, Richard Epstein takes the principle 
of restorative justice as a result of causing damage not necessarily through negli-
gence.  See generally Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 
151 (1973).  Ernest Weinrib and Richard Posner base restorative justice on causing 
damage through negligence.  See generally Ernest J. Weinrib, Toward a Moral Theory 
of Negligence Law, 2 L. & PHIL. 37 (1983); Richard A. Posner, The Concept of Correc-
tive Justice in Recent Theory of Tort Law, 10 J. LEG. STUD. 187 (1981).  George Fletcher 
bases restorative justice on the damage caused by creating a risk which is not mu-
tual.  See generally George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. 
L. REV. 537 (1972).  Jules Coleman claims that restorative justice must nullify gains 
and wrongful damages.  See JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKET MORAL AND LAW 184 
(1988) (introducing a response to The Concept of Corrective Justice in Recent Theory of 
Tort Law). 
68  For considerations of effectiveness in contract law, see ROBERT E. SCOTT & 
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After considering the ramifications of a lack of legal representa-
tion, I will analyze how risks of error may be expressed in civil law 
and claim agreements.  One possible claim is that, because in civil 
law the dispute is private, it is each party’s prerogative to use self-
representation, so that any risk of error is accepted.  Unlike crimi-
nal law, there must be consent in civil law because it is dispositive.  
No one is obligated to file a civil claim even if they have good 
cause to do so; creditors may forgive and waive debts and plain-
tiffs may withdraw their claims or may reach a settlement.  Even 
after winning the case, the plaintiff may still return the money to 
the defendant, and if the defendant wins, they must still pay the 
plaintiff. 
Because both parties have the freedom to conduct transactions 
of money and property without being bound by considerations of 
justice or efficiency, based on the principle of freedom to contract, 
does this negate the argument of risks of error?  Does a litigant 
who chooses not to be represented accept all of the risks inherent 
in this decision? 
In my view, though civil law is dispositive, and freedom to 
contract is a fundamental principle of it, this does not obviate the 
risk of error.  The reason for this is that there is no justification to 
view choosing self-representation as a surrender of rights as the 
victim of a wrongful verdict.  Choosing self-representation does 
not mean welcoming the damages and losses of judicial error; ra-
                                                                                                                   
DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 8 (1988) (explaining the functions 
of contract law); Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule paradigm and the Limits of Contract 
Law, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 389, 392, 399, 402-403, 416 (1993) (explaining the de-
fault rule paradigm, as well as the paradigm’s normative constraints and limits).  
As for effectiveness in tort suits, according to Calabresi’s definition, the aim of tort 
suits is to limit the damages of accidents and the costs of preventing them.  There-
fore, the preferred legal regime to accomplish this is giving the responsibility to 
the one best equipped to consider this (i.e., the one who can consider optimally if 
and how to exact cost which can prevent damage and to act on the basis of this 
consideration).  See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL 
AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970); Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Towards a 
Test for Strict Liability in Torts 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972).  For the preferred legal re-
gime being negligence, see generally Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972).   For economic negligence as the basis for the tort of negli-
gence as presented in the ruling of the American judge Learned Hand, see general-
ly United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).  As for the right 
of private property as a tool to reach economic effectiveness, see generally Garrett 
Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968); Harold Demsetz, 
Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967); ROBERT COOTER & 
THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 88 (1988) (introducing the economic theory of 
property); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 31 (1992) (introducing 
the relationship between economic analysis and property). 
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ther, the litigant seeks to enforce their rights and to win the case.  
The litigant has no interest in being damaged by a court’s wrongful 
verdict.  Nevertheless, in practice and despite the litigant’s inten-
tions, the risks are vastly increased.  A litigant cannot be aware of 
the deficiencies of self-representation and so cannot accept them.  
Had the litigant desired to forgive, to waive, to compromise, or to 
pay the other party, they would not have entered an adversarial 
proceeding.  The fact that they have done so indicates that they 
have no intent to concede the case to the benefit of the opposing 
party.  
This causes the following question: Does a litigant who chooses 
self-representation, who incorrectly evaluates the quality of self-
representation as opposed to litigation with representation, not 
commit a mistake which the court should in fact ignore?  Not every 
party who signs a contract mistakenly may withdraw from it.  If 
the mistake is of a sort that the party assumes of his own free will, 
it is insufficient to frustrate the contract.69  
A distinction must be made between determining a sweeping a 
priori rule that contracts will be considered null and void due to 
defects in the consent of a party and a situation in which no such 
rule exists but requires an examination of one’s consent in each 
case.  This distinction is necessary because if vitiated consent is an-
alyzed on a case-by-case basis, the other party relies on this con-
sent, and this factor must be taken into consideration.  On the other 
hand, when legislation determines ab initio that a certain type of 
contract is null and void due to vitiated consent, there is no one 
who relies on such consent, because it is known a priori that such a 
contract is worthless. 
The argument that one should disregard the consent to self-
representation belongs to the former category of cases, in which 
there is a sweeping rule that such consent will be null and void.  
The reason for this is the inherent flaw in such a desire; on the one 
hand, people want the best form of litigation, but, on the other 
hand, they mistakenly believe that self-representation is superior to 
litigation with representation.  This is a pervasive flaw in consent, 
and, to avoid it, any consent to conduct such litigation should be a 
priori negated, which results in no injury through the assumption 
                                                   
69  In an English case, the Court of Appeal found that the party had taken 
upon himself the risk of a common mistake, and therefore the contract was not 
frustrated.  See generally Amalgamated Investment and Property Co. Ltd. v. John 
Walker & Sons Ltd. [1977] 1 WLR 164 (CA) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
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of the other party.  
We cannot say that the opposing parties accept the risk of infe-
rior litigation, because they would never undertake such a risk if 
they knew the inferior character of self-representation.  The only 
reason they assume the risk is because they believe self-
representation is superior to representation by another party.  The 
assumption that they are interested in maximizing the quality of 
legislation is inconsistent with the feasibility of undertaking the 
risk that self-representation will be more successful.  
An instructive analogy is consenting to accept results of a poly-
graph test.  If the assumption is that the two parties believe sincere-
ly that they are factually correct and want to convince others that 
this is accurate, then their interest lies in a test that maximizes the 
epistemic state.  If what maximizes the epistemic state is judicial 
reasoning rather than a polygraph, then choosing a polygraph in-
volves vitiated consent.  The parties do not (or one of them at least 
does not) know the truth of the matter, that by choosing to accept a 
polygraph test, they hurt their ability to persuade using their genu-
ine claims.  This situation justifies rejecting an agreement by both 
parties to accept the polygraph, due to vitiated consent, but be-
cause this is an a priori invalidation, it does not injure either party 
through reliance on the opposing party on this agreement.70  
This argument does not impinge upon the general principle 
that the two parties have the right to stipulate as to what evidence 
they will present and forge compromise agreements; compromise 
agreements and evidentiary agreements are also subject to defects 
in consent.  There is no inherent vitiated consent in these agree-
ments, except in cases where the parties are unaware that they are 
acting in opposition to their own interests. 
There is a link between the rejection of the consent argument 
and the rejection of the paternalism argument.  The objection to pa-
ternalism assumes that a person may indeed want a bad result, and 
paternalistic interference withholds from him the unfavorable out-
come he seeks.  However, if someone desires an activity that causes 
a bad result but does not want the bad result, such as if they be-
lieve that the outcome will not be unfavorable, in this case there is 
a good reason to prevent the undesirable outcome which they do 
not want.  This is not the imposition of a foreign will upon another; 
                                                   
70  The Supreme Court of Israel ruled thus concerning consent to polygraph 
testing in civil suits.  See generally CA 61/84 Biasi et al. v. Levi 42(1) PD 446 (1988) 
(Isr.).  
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one can bring the realization of the other’s true desire by this inter-
vention.71  
Mill presents such an argument to justify intervention in an-
other’s activity.  If a person is about to cross a bridge that is struc-
turally unsound and there is no time to warn him, one is justified 
in grabbing them and pulling them back.  Mill holds that this is not 
an impairment of their liberty.  Compelling such a litigant to accept 
representation is not an offense to their autonomy, just as stopping 
the wayfarer from setting foot on the bridge is not an offense to 
their freedom.72  The autonomy argument based on freedom of 
conscience does not apply in civil law, because the claimant who is 
not interested in a civil trial will not file a lawsuit, while the re-
spondent who refuses to participate in a trial will be compelled to 
accept a verdict based on his lack of defense.  
To summarize, as Rabeea Assy correctly concludes, the verdict 
in a civil case can be very hard for the party being injured by it.  
The risk of error is quite high, not unlike that in criminal cases.  
Some consequences of this include the following: incarceration due 
to contempt of court, involuntary commitment to a mental–health 
institution, deportation, revocation of citizenship, and loss of pa-
rental or custodial rights.  Financially, a hefty debt can be just as, if 
not more, significant to a litigant than a criminal fine.  Therefore, 
the issue of representation must be considered in the final model, 
in light of the arguments and claims presented above.73 
Expanding on an issue raised in the first part of this article, 
concerning the difficulty of realizing the expressive–ceremonial 
aspect of justice in a virtual environment.  Any Internet courthouse 
inherently makes confrontation between the parties more difficult, 
first and foremost in the cross-examination of witnesses.74   Indeed, 
the interim report of Lord Briggs takes note of this problem, which 
makes the proceeding more inquisitorial rather than adversarial, as 
mentioned above in part one:  
                                                   
71  Assy makes a similar claim about the issue of the distinction between 
means-related paternalism and ends-related paternalism, as paternalism of the 
former type is more justifiable than the latter.  See ASSY, supra note 57, at 156-57 
(“Paternalism which concerns only means is more justifiable . . . than paternalism 
concerned with ends . . . .”). 
72  See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 158 (David Bromwich & George Kateb 
eds., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (discussing the functions of police and the extent to 
which the government can intervene in crime prevention).  
73  See ASSY, supra note 57, at 57-58 (describing the relationship between men-
tal competence and self-representation). 
74  See CIVIL COURTS STRUCTURE REVIEW INTERIM REPORT, supra note 54, at ch. 6. 
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Finally, the [online court] will mark a radical departure 
from the traditional courts (outside the small claims track) 
by being less adversarial, more investigative, and by mak-
ing the judge his or her own lawyer.  By that I mean that 
judges will receive no assistance in the law from the parties, 
and may well need more training, more frequently, in the 
law relevant to the caseload of the OC that they receive at 
present.  I acknowledge that, even now, the DJs who decide 
cases on the small claims track already have to be their own 
lawyers, but the ambition of the OC will extend to a sub-
stantially wider caseload.75  
Indeed, the reports raise the possibility of using videoconfer-
ence for interrogation.  The interim report notes:76  
Nor is the phrase ‘online court,’ and the acronym ODR, 
meant to suggest that the whole of the procedure for the 
resolution of disputes submitted to that court will inevita-
bly take place online, rather than, for example, on the tele-
phone, by video conference, or in a traditional face-to-face 
encounter with a judge in a hearing room.  That may have 
been a reasonable impression to be derived from the ODR 
Report, but the Justice Report contemplated that determina-
tion by a judge online would only be one of a range of op-
tions, the others including at least telephone and frontal 
hearings.77  
 
The main idea is that in a frontal encounter in the courtroom, 
cross-examination endows the legal proceeding with an expressive 
advantage which cannot be attained in a videoconference interro-
gation.  For this reason, having the proceeding take place in a 
courthouse, with all the ceremonial characteristics of a trial, may be 
significant. 
This is related to a broader theory on the expressive function of 
justice.78  This is a general theory of justice, applying to both proce-
                                                   
75  Id., para. 6.15. 
76  See id. paras. 4.25, 4.26, 5.129 (discussing the Reform Programme and its 
limitations).  
77  Id., para. 6.4; see also CHANCERY MODERNISATION REVIEW FINAL REPORT, su-
pra note 56, para. 6.80. 
78  See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A 
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dural and other aspects.  The expressive approach brings out val-
ues and feelings by institutionalizing them.  For example, Stephen 
argues that criminal justice is simply the institutionalization of 
vengeance, much as marriage is the institutionalization of lust.79  
From another perspective, the expressive function of justice inher-
ently endorses certain types of behavior and rejects others.80 
According to this theory, justice functions by transmitting 
normative and value-based messages through ceremonies, sym-
bols, declarations, and ambiances.  The ceremonial function of jus-
tice is one among its many aims.  It is expressive, in that it trans-
mits a normative, value-based message; it may also be required in 
order to generate an atmosphere where litigants act in an appro-
priate and desirable manner.  The courts act as guardians of certain 
fundamental concepts—the ethos and tradition of society as a 
whole and the legal system in particular.  The ongoing commit-
ment to this ethos is expressed through repetition and reinforce-
ment of symbolic and ceremonial practices.  Thus, the legal system 
attempts to influence the consciousness of the public, by conveying 
certain messages and through a symbolic atmosphere which acts 
upon the litigants, even if they encounter the legal system only 
once in their lifetime.81  The expressive–ceremonial function also 
impacts judges, whose daily routine occurs in this arena.  As they 
are personally invested in the system, it makes them committed to 
the messages it transmits. 
Another advantage of legal proceedings is the intrinsic expres-
sion of the value of due process.  This may be examined using 
some of Tribe’s arguments against “trial by mathematics” in the 
                                                                                                                   
General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1531-1564 (2000) (discussing expres-
sivism in the context of individual conduct and additionally relating the theory to 
the expressive character of the law). 
79  See JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF 
ENGLAND 99 (1863) (describing the development of English criminal law and the 
current state of the law).  For a general argument about the expressive function as 
institutionalized emotions and the institutionalized expression of emotions, see 
generally Alan Strudler, The Power of Expressive Theories of Law, 60 MD. L. REV. 492 
(2001). 
80  See Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. 
REV. 339, 342-43 (2000) (discussing the components and implications of the attitu-
dinal theory). 
81  See Nakhshon Shokhat, The Moral and Legal Duty to Protect the Innocent 
from False Conviction: A Critical and Analytical Study Regarding the Derivative 
Normative and Procedural Obligations of the Legal System 207-208 (2015) (un-
published Ph.D. thesis, University of Haifa Faculty of Law) (on file with the au-
thor). 
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criminal law of evidence.  Tribe argues that an announcement of an 
a priori probability of guilt impinges on the expressive value of the 
presumption of innocence; even if there is an a priori probability of 
guilt, it must not be stated, because the declaration itself transmits 
a message, which detracts from the commitment to the presump-
tion of innocence.82  
Tribe further argues that determining a few innocent people, 
which society is willing to sacrifice, by wrongful conviction, 
through quantifying what constitutes proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, undermines the message carried by the principle of due 
process to the innocent.83  
In light of these considerations, video testimony cannot perfect-
ly replace testimony in court.  First, video testimony negates the 
expressive advantages of the judicial process.  A person testifying 
at home does so in a safe, familiar environment, and over the phys-
ical conditions of which he exerts control.  However, when one tes-
tifies in court, those conditions are dictated by the ceremonial set-
ting.  A courthouse is not home.  Rather than comfort and 
convenience, the court is designed to express governmental power.  
The symbolic structure of the courtroom is meant to represent cer-
tain feelings and values.  For example, people rise when the judge 
enters the courtroom; the judge sits above all others present, with 
the national and state flags conveying his authority.  The witnesses 
are meant to be intimidated:  They testify in uncomfortable and 
imposing conditions, under oath or affirmation, with deputies and 
bailiffs present, and without food or drink.  The court often induc-
es a feeling of awe in the witness.  This deters witnesses who might 
be tempted to testify falsely. 
Additionally, there is an epistemic difference between video 
and in–court testimony, as the latter offers greater opportunity for 
the court to evaluate both the witness and the testimony.  Griffin 
writes:  
In United States v. Yates, for example, the Eleventh Circuit 
found live, two–way video conferencing with overseas wit-
nesses insufficient to satisfy the Confrontation Clause be-
cause it lacked the “intangible elements of the ordeal of tes-
                                                   
82  Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Pro-
cess, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1371 (1971) (discussing the impact of measuring and 
acknowledging a factual presumption of guilt on jurors in criminal cases). 
83  See Id. at 1372-1375 (detailing the implications of uncertainty in the context 
of criminal procedure). 
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tifying.”  Physical presence can serve important expressive 
functions, but as discussed here, the essential purposes of 
confrontation are analytic ones, and the substantive interac-
tion between prior statements and current testimony pro-
duces information that speaks more directly to those con-
cerns.84 
As Kostelak adds: 
[V]ideoconferencing may distort nonverbal cues, such as 
facial expressions, gazes, postures, and gestures.  For ex-
ample, laggy streams may obscure facial reactions.  Even in 
a live stream that is working perfectly, a headshot may 
overemphasize facial expression while leaving gestures 
partially obscured or out of the shot entirely.85 
Indeed, “[c]ross–examination is the greatest legal engine ever 
invented for the discovery of truth.”86  If cross-examination on vid-
eoconferencing is epistemically deficient, an important tool for un-
covering the truth is missing.  An inability to cross-examine 
properly increases the risk of error. 
Just because there are some deficiencies in online court pro-
ceedings, the whole endeavor is not invalid.  A balance must be 
struck between these disadvantages and the upsides of online 
court.  As long as video cross-examination is possible, most of the 
advantages of confrontation are maintained.  Consequently, the 
gap between video testimony and in–court testimony is not neces-
sarily so vast as to justify sacrificing the loss of efficiency provided 
by the online court.  In any case, even the epistemic interpretation 
of body language based on frontal observation is far from precise. 
To deal with these concerns, sanctions may be imposed for 
costs87 if a witness testifies falsely.  Additionally, false testimony is 
                                                   
84  Lisa Kern Griffin, The Content of Confrontation, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 51, 65 (2011) (internal citations omitted). 
85  Kostelak, supra note 28, at 4 (internal citation omitted). 
86  5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF 
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1367, at 32 (1974). 
87  Regarding trial costs, two central models are prevalent: the British and the 
American model.  The former is more common globally.  Under the American 
model, each party bears its own costs.  Under the British model, the losing party is 
often required to pay the other's costs.  In Israel, the British model applies.  How-
ever, the court has wide discretion to determine who would bear the costs, based 
on the circumstances of each case.  For further analysis, see generally Eisenberg, 
supra note 20. 
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a criminal offense incurring fine or imprisonment.88   However, a 
punitive sanction may be imposed for perjury only if the offender 
has been found guilty at trial.  This sanction seems to be weak, for 
the following reasons: 
Invoking criminal law is complicated, since it raises issues of 
proof.  The model proposed here is based on the online court ad-
dressing simple cases.  Complications tend to drag cases back to 
the regular courthouse.  Issues of perjury and evidence are an addi-
tional complication.  A civil court may determine that a witness is 
unreliable even without a detailed written opinion.  This will likely 
cause difficulty when it comes to indicting the witness. 
The very act of putting a witness on trial is a kind of punish-
ment.  Therefore, it is inaccurate to assume that the witness will be 
vindicated if found not guilty. 
An additional danger involved in criminal law is over–
deterrence.  Not only perjurers will hesitate; honest and innocent 
witnesses, too, will either avoid testifying or testify with an overa-
bundance of caution.  Witnesses can be thoroughly cross-
examined, which tends to create the impression, sometimes mis-
takenly, that they are untrustworthy.  Introducing a criminal di-
mension might chill testimonies to an unacceptable degree. 
Civil and criminal law might clash, in appearance or in fact, 
due to different evidentiary standards.  This might seriously un-
dermine the finality of the court’s decision and the public’s ac-
ceptance thereof. 
These considerations lead to one conclusion: Criminal law is a 
blunt instrument, unsuited to the concept of online justice.  While it 
should be noted that in the United Kingdom, legislation and litera-
ture have not provided a complete civil alternative to punitive 
sanctions for a perjurious witness,89 criminal law should be used to 
                                                   
88  See, e.g., Criminal Justice Act 1967, c. 80, § 89(2) (Eng. & Wales) (“The Per-
jury Act 1911 shall have effect as if this section were contained in that Act.”).  
Criminal common law similarly forbids false testimony. 
89  See The Civil Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2013, pts. 44-47 (Eng. & 
Wales) (providing rules that relate to cost).  Part 44.1 defines "costs" as follows: 
“’[C]osts’ includes fees, charges, disbursements, expenses, remuneration, reim-
bursement allowed to a litigant in person under rule 46.5 and any fee or reward 
charged by a lay representative for acting on behalf of a party in proceedings allo-
cated to the small claims track.”  The burden of payment may only be placed on 
the losing party; yet, the parties may reach an agreement regarding costs.  The 
costs which may be claimed are those of attorneys, barristers or counselors, wit-
nesses and experts.  In addition, the court has the authority to rule on ancillary 
expenses, as well as the authority not to do so, if this is justified by the circum-
stances.  See id. pt. 44.2 (“Where the court orders a party to pay costs subject to de-
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
 
952 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 39:4 
deal with perjury only in the most severe cases. 
Dealing with issues of perjury in the online court context 
should be divided into several areas.  Regarding forms and docu-
mentation, the litigants should be warned that any falsification of 
evidence is a criminal offense, carrying a penalty as set by the law.  
The legislature must give the court discretion to issue any appro-
priate order, including the imposition of costs against a litigant 
who falsely testifies.  If the perjurer is a party, the party will natu-
rally lose the case and often be forced to pay costs.  It is also ap-
propriate to impose punitive costs in sufficiently serious cases.  
Additionally, case law should be made available online, so that lit-
igants will be able to plan their own moves, while also serving a 
function of deterrence. 
From this short analysis, it appears that the nature of testimony 
in a virtual environment should be addressed in legislation.  Evi-
dence law must also be adjusted to the virtual environment, grap-
pling with such issues as false testimony, the evaluation of wit-
nesses, issues of reliability, and so on. 
This part discussed problems of judicial process in a virtual en-
vironment; the lack of frontal confrontation and the lack of deter-
rence regarding false testimony, when both testimony and cross-
examination take place using a videoconference.  Current law is 
not fitted for online adjudication.  Thus, I propose a model of wide 
judicial discretion, including the imposition of costs, is proposed to 
                                                                                                                   
tailed assessment, it will order that party to pay a reasonable sum on account of 
costs, unless there is good reason not to do so.”).  In small claims cases, costs are 
limited to trial costs alone.  See Make a court claim for money, GOV.UK, 
https://www.gov.uk/make-court-claim-for-money/court-fee 
[https://perma.cc/VW2P-EDFA] (providing the table for court costs based on the 
amount of the claim in small-claims court in England).  In addition to this legisla-
tion, the Contempt of Court Act (1981) must be considered.  See Contempt of 
Court Act 1981, c. 49 (U.K.) (discussing the strict liability rule and other aspects of 
law and procedure).  By law, contempt of court can be declared if one ignores a 
court order or refuses to show up for a court date.  Another means for ruling on 
costs is based on the inherent authority of the court.  The inherent authority of 
English courts may be employed to achieve various ends.  There are four catego-
ries of conduct which might lead to a stay of a civil proceeding, based on the in-
herent authority of the court: proceedings designed to deceive the court, proceed-
ings which were not submitted in a sincere manner but used in an inappropriate 
way or for an improper purpose, procedures unfounded or not serving any useful 
purpose, and duplicate procedures aimed at harassing the court and causing mis-
chief.  The remedy provided is stay of proceedings, rather than costs.  For a com-
prehensive discussion of this issue, see I.H. Jacob, The Inherent Jurisdiction of the 
Court, 23 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 23, 27-28 (1970) (describing the concept of inher-
ent jurisdiction). 
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advance justice. 
  
4.  CONCLUSION 
 
The future holds many changes.  The online court raises com-
plex concerns and questions; yet, it appears that, in the bottom line, 
advantages outweigh the disadvantages.  A system built upon the 
concept of adversarial, frontal cross-examination, when transferred 
to an online arena, will encounter problems.  Therefore, a desirable 
model must initially be based on simple, low–cost procedures.  
This model should be adopted as an experimental program.  Only 
after it is fully implemented and the deficiencies are addressed, the 
model should be applied to more complex and expensive proceed-
ings.  Trailblazing of a new legal model should be done carefully, 
accommodating the existing legal system in a controlled and sys-
tematic environment, with the aim of increasing the accessibility of 
justice. 
In my view, when a process moves online, its nature changes 
on the most fundamental level.  It is neither feasible nor necessary 
for the online court to use the familiar tools of real-life court; in-
stead, new tools must be developed to account for technological 
development.  The lessons to be learned throughout this process 
might be able to improve the legal system in its entirety and to ef-
fectively minimize future conflicts. 
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